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Federations

AUTHOR Rector, Chad
PUBLISHER Cornell University Press (02/20/2009)
PRODUCT TYPE Paperback (Paperback)

Description

Why would states ever give up their independence to join federations? While federation can provide more wealth or security than self-sufficiency, states can in principle get those benefits more easily by cooperating through international organizations such as alliances or customs unions.Chad Rector develops a new theory that states federate when their leaders expect benefits from closer military or economic cooperation but also expect that cooperation via an international organization would put some of the states in a vulnerable position, open to extortion from their erstwhile partners. The potentially vulnerable states hold out, refusing to join alliances or customs unions, and only agreeing to military and economic cooperation under a federal constitution.Rector examines several historical cases: the making of a federal Australia and the eventual exclusion of New Zealand from the union, the decisions made within Buenos Aires and Prussia to build Argentina and Germany largely through federal contracts rather than conquests, and the failures of postindependence unions in East Africa and the Caribbean.

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Product Format
Product Details
ISBN-13: 9780801475245
ISBN-10: 0801475244
Binding: Paperback or Softback (Trade Paperback (Us))
Content Language: English
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Page Count: 224
Carton Quantity: 32
Product Dimensions: 5.90 x 0.60 x 8.90 inches
Weight: 0.70 pound(s)
Feature Codes: Bibliography, Index, Maps, Table of Contents
Country of Origin: US
Subject Information
BISAC Categories
Political Science | Civics & Citizenship
Political Science | International Relations - General
Grade Level: College Freshman and up
Dewey Decimal: 320.404
Library of Congress Control Number: 2008043694
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Why would states ever give up their independence to join federations? While federation can provide more wealth or security than self-sufficiency, states can in principle get those benefits more easily by cooperating through international organizations such as alliances or customs unions.Chad Rector develops a new theory that states federate when their leaders expect benefits from closer military or economic cooperation but also expect that cooperation via an international organization would put some of the states in a vulnerable position, open to extortion from their erstwhile partners. The potentially vulnerable states hold out, refusing to join alliances or customs unions, and only agreeing to military and economic cooperation under a federal constitution.Rector examines several historical cases: the making of a federal Australia and the eventual exclusion of New Zealand from the union, the decisions made within Buenos Aires and Prussia to build Argentina and Germany largely through federal contracts rather than conquests, and the failures of postindependence unions in East Africa and the Caribbean.

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Paperback