Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
| AUTHOR | Ostrom, Elinor |
| PUBLISHER | Cambridge University Press (09/23/2015) |
| PRODUCT TYPE | Paperback (Paperback) |
Description
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
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Product Format
Product Details
ISBN-13:
9781107569782
ISBN-10:
1107569788
Binding:
Paperback or Softback (Trade Paperback (Us))
Content Language:
English
More Product Details
Page Count:
294
Carton Quantity:
26
Product Dimensions:
5.60 x 0.50 x 8.50 inches
Weight:
0.90 pound(s)
Feature Codes:
Bibliography,
Index,
Price on Product,
Maps,
Illustrated
Country of Origin:
US
Subject Information
BISAC Categories
Political Science | History & Theory - General
Political Science | Political Economy
Dewey Decimal:
333.2
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
publisher marketing
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
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Author:
Ostrom, Elinor
Elinor Ostrom is Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science, Codirector of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, and Codirector of the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC) at Indiana University.Ostrom was awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.
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