Since the end of the Cold War and it 's associated deterrent strategy, the United States 19 global responsibilities have not only increased the U.S. Army 's tempo in stability and support operations but has also increasingly challenged longstanding roles of traditional Army headquarters - particularly the division headquarters. U.S. Army divisions over the last decade have increasingly found themselves operating beyond the tactical level of war - an area they are not organized or prepared for. Division doctrine over the last decade has clearly framed the division as the Army 's highest tactical unit, asserting that it does not prosecute the operational level of war. However, the realities of the last decade have demonstrated that Army divisions do operate beyond their traditional tactical roles and must be prepared to operate in much more complex environments that span the operational level of war. This monograph hypothesizes that U.S. Army Divisions are operating beyond the tactical level of war, and prosecuting the operational level of war on a routine basis. If this monograph 's hypothesis is true, two important questions emerge. First, what implications does this trend have for how Army 's divisions prepare for future operations, and secondly, and the focus of the monograph, if divisions are routinely operating at the operational level of war, why do they have a METL based on tactical tasks? Two case studies of past 10th Mountain Division operations - Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and ENDURING FFEEDOM provide a basis for analysis against criteria extracted from current Army white papers outlining the desirable characteristics of our future forces. These operations highlight the increasingly complex environment that divisions operate in, as well as the widening gap of irrelevance in the U.S Army 's Training doctrine. The study concludes that the traditional, tactical METL approach is no longer appropriate for today 's Army divisions requiring a shift to a more ope